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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN RESTRAINT ON THE MEDIA
John de J. Pemberton, Jr.*
I. Introduction
The problem of "trial by press" has been a recurring phenomenon in our
society, but demographic and technological changes give it a different cast in
recent years. We are more dependent upon the mass media for public informarion about controversies that find their way into litigation, and the parties
to such litigation are more exposed to the viscissitudes of public reporting for
the image they have in the eyes of their communities. The names of Dr. Sam
Sheppard, Billy Sol Estes, Candace Mossler, Dr. Carl Coppolino, and Bobbie
Baker quickly become common currency in nearly forty million homes; and
the public exposure of matters that might have affected issues in the cases of
Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby was unprecedented.
Because the dangers to a fair criminal trial from such publicity have been
so vividly brought home to the bar, strenuous new efforts have been made to
find a solution to this problem. Among these, the efforts of the ABA's Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press' deserve the most serious attention.
In probing the constitutional dimensions of the Committee's recommendations,
we are faced with an apparent conflict within the Bill of Rights.
The ancient Greek conceptualization of tragedy lay not in the triumph of
wrong over right, but in the clash of rights, each unassailable in itself. Too
often our discussion of the present problem has assumed that it partakes of that
quality of the tragedy. Before we weep, we should analyze the issues with
skepticism: Are our choices limited to the exalting of one guarantee from our
charter of liberties over another? Must fair trial really yield to freedom of the
press, if it is not to dominate it? The Advisory Committee believes that its
carefully framed and restrained recommendations avoid that result. At the
same time, however, the Committee has proposed direct sanctions against editors
and journalists, albeit in carefully circumscribed situations, and avoids the conclusion of conflict by defending the constitutionality of these sanctions.2
II. Direct Restraints on the News Media
The recommendations set forth in part IV of the ABA Report provide for
a direct restraint on the news media only in two circumstances: (1) when
there has been a knowing violation of a valid judicial order not to disseminate
facts during or before trial in jury cases (or before disposition without trial) ;3
* Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union. In the preparation of this paper
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1 ABA ADvsoRY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR
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and (2) when there has been a deliberate action during the progress of a criminal
jury trial (including the period of jury selection) constituting a serious threat
to a fair trial.' In the first category the valid judicial order, on which a contempt
prosecution would be founded, must have barred dissemination of specified information referred to in the course of a judicial hearing from which the public
was excluded.' The recommendations applicable to the second category call for
punishment by the contempt power only if all the following circumstances exist:
(a) if the maker or disseminator of a statement knows that the trial was in progress; (b) if the statement was intended to be disseminated by any means of public
communication; (c) if it was made about some aspect of the case that goes
beyond the public record; and (d) if the statement was "reasonably calculated"
to affect the outcome of the trial and did "seriously threaten" such effect.'
It is significant that the Committee's commentary on the requirement that the
statement disseminated during trial must have been "reasonably calculated" to
affect the outcome speaks in terms of the criteria of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.' That is, the statement must either have actually been intended to
affect the outcome or have been made with reckless disregard for the consequences.' Thus, all of the Committee's recommended uses of the contempt
sanction against privately generated publicity are confined to instances in which
the conduct was either wilful or wanton.
Although the Committee's recommendations are premised on the belief
that in these limited circumstances "a conviction for contempt would [not]
abridge freedom of speech or of the press," '9 they clearly impose limitations on
the use of speech and press by journalists and private persons. The reconciliation
of such limitations is not uncommon to our tradition of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. For instance, we do not assume that the
first amendment protects the author of a fraudulent misrepresentation from civil
or criminal liability for fraud. Although both civil and criminal libel are feeling
the impact of the first amendment in cases decided during the 1960's, at least
civil liability for defamation survives. The censorship and control of obscenity,
or at least of "pandering," has not been eliminated by the free press guarantee.
Nor has the dissemination of gambling information yet been held to be protected
from criminal sanctions. Thus, the Committee is able to contend that carefully
limited restrictions on extrajudicial statements are not inconsistent with the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press.
0
the cases have shown great hostility
Certainly since Bridges v. California,"
to the imposition of judicial sanctions on the press. But the Committee correctly
notes that all of the current Supreme Court decisions reversing such contempt
& 1
' or a grand
convictions involved attempts by judges to protect themselves
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. See commentary in ABA REP. 151-52.
7 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8 ABA Rnp. 152.
9 Id. at 153.
10 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
11 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946).
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jury;" none overturned orders protecting a petit jury trying a criminal case.
The Committee finds support in the dictum of Chief Justice Warren in Wood
v. Georgia" that "of course the limitations on free speech assume a different
proportion when expression is directed toward a trial as compared to a grand
jury investigation."' 4 It might be added to the Committee's observation that
most contempt cases involve the further debilitating circumstance of trial court
judges seeking to insulate themselves from public criticism. The unseemliness of
that kind of judicial behavior in Pennekamp v. Florida" led Mr. Justice Murphy
to comment that a person's freedom should not rest on "the precarious base of
judicial sensitiveness and caprice."' Insofar as the Committee recommendation
is directed at protecting the fairmindedness of juries rather than the sensitivities
of the judge, they might well be distinguished from the adverse holdings in these
cases.
On the other hand, no decision of the United States Supreme Court having
current vitality sustains an exercise of the contempt power comparable to that
recommended by the Committee. Unlike fraud, libel, and obscenity, adoption
of the Committee's recommendations would involve carrying a new exception
out of the area assumed to be protected by the first amendment. Although the
recommendation is limited to punishment of wilful or wanton violators, the
uncertainty it creates will inevitably give good-faith commentators a pause as
well. As Justices Goldberg and Douglas implied in their concurring opinion
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"? somebody has to make fact determinations
about the wilfulness or wantonness of conduct, and the trier of fact is never
infallible.:" Sullivan itself was an ample illustration of the risks a litigant may
take when fact issues are submitted to a jury.
In support of its conclusion that its recommendation for the exercise of
the contempt power would be held constitutional, the Committee relies in part
on the "tenor"' 9 of the recent case of Sheppard v. Maxwell." I find it difficult
to find comfort in the Sheppard case for the Committee's conclusions. Dr. Sheppard was convicted in 1954 in a case that was bathed in the most outrageous
publicity imaginable. Even the publicity surrounding the 1963 assassination of
President Kennedy, which so permeated the nation that responsible observers
concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald could not have received a fair trial anywhere, lacked the venality of the press treatment dealt Sheppard. There are
not only suggestions of official complicity in the press abuses reported in Sheppard, but also implications of press stimulation of the official animus and misconduct. In the face of all of this, the Court concluded that the judge might
well have employed "other means [than restricting prejudicial news accounts]
that are often utilized to reduce the appearance of prejudicial material and to
12 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
13

Ibid.

14 Id. at 390.
15 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
16

Id. at 370 (concurring opinion).
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376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Id. at 300.
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protect the jury from outside influence."'" The Court then proceeded to enumerate three pages of description of the "other means" that the judge might have
employed,22 without once alluding to the imposition of sanctions on the news
media or the private sources" of prejudicial statements. The Court specifically
concluded that the procedures it suggested "would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial,"2 and so did not consider "what sanctions might be
It is true that the Court thus left
available against a recalcitrant press ....
open the question whether a court might invoke its power of contempt against
a "recalcitrant press," but it is difficult to imagine a case sufficiently outrageous
to require that question to be reached if Sheppard wasn't such a case.
Certainly a court could not exercise its contempt power if one
of the less drastic means enumerated in Sheppard would assure a fair
trial. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State2" the Court weighed a contention
that both the first and the fifth amendments were violated in the McCarran Act's flat ban on issuing passports to members of an organization
required to register under the act. The Secretary of State strenuously urged
the legitimacy of -Congress' concern over the uses hostile to internal security
that could be made of such passports.27 In striking down the statute, Mr. Justice
Goldberg recognized the validity of Congress' concern but emphasized that it
should have used "less drastic means" in achieving its goal.2" The availability
of "less drastic" means is highly relevant in analyzing the Committee's recommendations. The guarantees of speech and press serve central functions in the
processes of self-government; and if exceptions such as those for fraud, libel,
and obscenity have survived the adoption of the first amendment, it is significant
that they have tended to contract rather than to expand. The general commentary of the Committee devotes several pages to observations about the value
that a free press has had for the system of administering justice' and cites numerous instances of important contributions made by the press."0 Of course, the
Committee does not believe that the sanctions it proposes would inhibit the
press in the performance of this valuable role. But all exceptions have boundaries, and all boundaries tend to have some penumbras. A first amendment
without such exceptions is much less likely to inhibit the dissemination of beneficial information and criticism than otherwise.
The Committee proposes, as did the Supreme Court in Sheppard, many
measures designed to control the incidence of prejudicial publicity. The Committee acknowledges that its recommendation for use of the contempt power is
not a central one;"' it views the contempt power applicable to the private
21 Id. at 358.
22 Id. at 359-62.
23 I exclude witnesses from "private sources" in making that broad generalization. Witnesses, as distinguished from extrajudicial private parties, do have an official function that may
make them subject to the jurisdiction of a court in a pending proceedings.
24 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
25 Ibid.
26 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
27 Id. at 508-09.
28 Id. at 512.
29 ABA REP. 47-51.
30 Ibid.
31 Id. at 151.
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generation of extrajudicial statements in part IV as only a "desirable, and a
valuable supplement to the other steps recommended." 2 But, despite the Sheppard opinion's reference to some of these other means as ones "often utilized,""3
it is obvious that we have no experience with their systematic employment to
minimize the hazard of prejudicial publicity. At the very least, the democratic
bias in favor of first amendment freedoms ought to require the acquisition of
that experience before the new exception is carved out. Moreover, it may not
be mere wishful thinking on the part of one deeply committed to that bias td
believe that the attempt to make do with still less drastic means may be constitutionally required.
The Committee's reliance on the fact that the leading Supreme Court
decisions do not involve jury trials is a double-edged sword. The alternative
means that the Committee recommends to protect the jury were not applicable
to these nonjury situations. The court struck down restraints on the press in
these cases even though "less drastic" means were not available to protect
the judges who were the objects of the apparent tendency to influence.
Perhaps the most serious threat to the integrity of the judicial process considered in these major Supreme Court precedents was posed by the extrajudicial
statements in Craig v. Harney.3 4 In that case a newspaper had reported, with
serious inaccuracies, the trial of a civil case involving the forfeiture of a serviceman's lease for nonpayment of rent while absent in the service. 5 The jury
balked three times at complying with the judge's instructions to return a verdict
for the landlord; and after the instructed verdict was finally returned, a motion
was made on the tenant's behalf for a new trial.3 6 While the motion was pending, the newspaper reported the activities of local citizens who organized to
petition the judge to grant the new trial. Prior to a ruling on the motion, the
paper, noting the judge's lack of legal training, editorially commented on his
"high-handed" conduct of the earlier trial and demanded that the pending
motion be granted. The layman judge was an elected official who faced the
prospect of reelection in that district.8 7 No "less drastic means," such as orders
governing the conduct of prosecutors, law enforcement officers, witnesses, or court
officials, could have protected the judge from the pressure this publicity was
generating to influence his decision. Moreover, it was contended- not without force, I think - that since the case involved only private litigation, the
range of permissible comment should have been narrower than in a criminal
trial, which necessarily generates greater public concern.
In the face of all
these circumstances, the Supreme Court majority found that the newspaper's
conduct failed to rise to the level of an imminent or serious threat to a judge
of reasonable fortitude.39 A still higher degree of imminence and seriousness
might well be required to take the case across the line of "clear and present
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Ibid.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
Id. at 369.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 375-77.
Id. at 378.
See id. at 376.
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danger," when there are other less drastic means of protecting the judicial
process than merely relying upon one man's point of view in the imposition
of a direct restraint by contempt.
III. Indirect Restraints on Information Sources
Some concern should also be given to the constitutional status of the
"other means" recommended by the Committee. If the express guarantees of
the first ten amendments create "penumbras" of related protections,4" the first
amendment may establish a right in the press to sources of information as well
as to freedom to disseminate. The reason for the hostility that the press has
shown to the Committee's recommendations is the feeling that the press is less
free when its sources of information have been dried up.
One can certainly imagine cases involving official silence that have, or ought
to have, constitutional implications. If not in the name of the first amendments
right of free press, then perhaps in the name of the sixth amendments right to
a public trial, some limitations on the sources of information about the criminal
process would surely become invalid. However, the Committee's proposed
standards certainly rest upon a better footing. I doubt that any constitutional
argument has ever proposed that every fact coming to official knowledge must
necessarily be made public. The movement of troops and materiel in wartime
are kept secret without question, and a secrecy is customarily practiced in some
aspects of international diplomacy. The conferences of judges on pending
litigation are zealously protected from publicity. Statutory limitations on the
divulgence of matters reported in income tax returns would not lightly be
challenged.
I believe that some hint of the acceptable scope of restraints on sources
of information can be found in the historic purposes of the framers of the Constitution. Of course, to make an argument from the historic purposes of a
constitutional provision is doubly dangerous. Lawyers and judges are often
poor historians; and the historic intention, even if accurately found, may have
no rational applicability to present-day interpretation. However, Mr. Justice
Brennan, in his concurring opinion in School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, " suggested what I think is a proper use of historic purpose. Not what
the framers intended the application to be, but the "consequences which the
'
are relevant to present-day interpretation. Thus, the key
Framers deeply feared" 42
question is not whether the sixth amendment was intended to permit restraint on
the press, or its sources, but what evil was that amendment aimed at avoiding.
I suggest that the framers of the sixth amendment feared an exertion of the
sovereign's power to delay or influence the outcome of a trial, for the trial was
meant to protect the individual citizen from the direct deprivation of his life,
liberty, or property by the sovereign. They feared the king's telling the judge
or jury what to do. If that is the core of the sixth amendment's interest, it is
40
41
42

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963).
Id. at 236.
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relevant that the objects of the sanctions proposed in parts I, II, and III of the
Committee's recommendations are public officials, not private commentators.
When the district attorney, the chief of police, or an ordinary policeman employs
the press to affect the impartiality of the tribunal that will determine a citizen's
liberty, it is the state that is acting, just as much as when the king told his judges
how he wanted a case decided. The failure to inhibit these officials in their
public statements, if the statements do in fact affect impartiality, is a failure
on the part of the state to provide "a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury" as the sixth amendment commands. No such command reaches privately
generated publicity in the same manner. Furthermore, the impact of sanctions
directly applicable to the private maker of publicity may discourage that kind
of reporting which is essential to having a truly "public" trial.
IV. Conclusion
Thus, I suggest that the Committee's recommendations are constitutional
insofar as they serve the historic purpose of the sixth amendment by protecting
against state interference with the impartiality of judicial tribunals; insofar as
the recommendations curtail the right of the private press to comment on litigation, they are constitutionally suspect. The judicial process needs the criticism
of informed public opinion, and this criticism should not be lightly suppressed.
This is not to say that the penumbra of rights created by the first and the
sixth amendments will never overlap. Nor is it to say that the interests of the
press in being unrestrained and of litigants in fair trials are without points of
conflict. But it is possible that the first amendment may admit of no new exception for the interests of a fair trial, such as the use of the contempt power
proposed in part IV of the ABA Report. Certainly no exception should
be presumed until the need for it has been convincingly shown.

